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Abstract 
 
A psychosocial approach to national behavior, emphasizing the foreign policy roles selected by 
states, has proven to be a fertile source of insights into the ways states respond to their external 
environment. Disaggregating the phenomenon of role into several distinct processes—e.g., role- 
taking, role contestation, role enactment, and role transition—highlights interactions across 
different levels of analysis as part of a general process of role location. We focus in this paper 
specifically on the process of role-taking leading to role selection and conceive of this process as 
operating simultaneously at the state, domestic, and individual levels of analysis. Rather than 
assume that states simply choose roles, or that elite policy makers choose roles on behalf of their 
states, we propose in this paper a systems model and hypotheses about cross-level effects among 
elements in a complex adaptive system. This model relies on the auxiliary assumption that the 
congruence of strategic orientations across levels of analysis facilitates role selection, and that 
this congruence is observable in the rhetoric of political leaders. To analyze these cross-level 
effects, we employ Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) coding of national role conceptions (NRCs), 
coupled with motive imagery assessment of U.S. presidents and statistical measures of U.S. 
power and domestic political arrangements, to test the theoretical proposition that coherent 
national role selection will emerge primarily when international, domestic, and individual 
motivations are congruent (aligned with one another). We hypothesize that these conditions are 
likely instances of role-taking that result empirically in the selection of strategic role orientations 
that are congruent with these role demands. 
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Congruence across Levels of Role-taking in U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
 It is by now a commonplace that the study of U.S. foreign policy can proceed from 
different levels of analysis characterized by different space and time scales. To take just one 
example, Lovell (1970) identifies the three analytical perspectives of strategic interaction, 
historical dynamics, and decision-making. The strategic perspective understands U.S. foreign 
policy as a series of moves in a strategic interaction situation designed to protect or achieve 
national interests vis-à-vis other states (Lovell 1970: 61). A historical dynamics perspective 
identifies patterns of continuity and change in the foreign policy of the United States, thus 
conceiving the U.S. as a society with relationships to others in a given world environment during 
a specific historical period (Lovell 1970: 139). A decision-making perspective identifies “a 
particular foreign policy decision or a series of decisions” as the focus of analysis (Lovell 1970: 
205). These perspectives give rise to multiple theoretical models addressing research questions 
about the dynamics of U.S. foreign policy (Lovell 1970: 57).  
 In this paper we adopt the second perspective and investigate the historical dynamics of 
U.S. foreign policy with role theory as a form of systems theory. A system is defined by general 
systems theorists as a set of interdependent elements interacting with one another and producing 
emergent properties, as a function of their relationships to one another, within a broader 
environment (Jervis 1997: 6; see also Waltz 1979). Role theory provides a model of social 
systems in which the set of interacting and interdependent elements are also mutually aware of 
one another (Walker, Malici, and Schafer 2011). Social systems share the features of other 
systems in that they are defined by patterns of interaction that are characterized by periods of 
continuity and change in relations among the elements of the system. In the language of general 
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systems theory, these periods are marked by patterns of stability (equilibrium) or instability 
(disequilibrum) over time.  
 
Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
 Role theory applied to the substantive domain of world politics specifies patterns of 
stability or instability as continuity or change in the roles that define relationships among the 
different actors that constitute an international social system. It suggests answers to the following 
research questions in the study of the historical dynamics of U.S foreign policy. How does the 
United States locate its role(s) in the international system? How does a U.S. role persist or evolve 
over time? How does the United States transition from one role to another? These questions are 
consistent with a focus on “the preconditions for and precipitants of events” associated with the 
analysis of historical dynamics (Lovell 1970: 57).  
 The core concepts in role theory as a social systems theory are role conception as a 
cognitive element, role enactment as a behavioral element, role expectation as a social element 
of the system, and role demand to represent the environment (situation) in which the social 
system operates. In the analysis of historical dynamics, the key concepts are role demands and 
role conceptions, which address the environmental and cognitive features that influence patterns 
of continuity and change in U.S. foreign policy.1 Foreign policy in this analysis is conceived as 
role enactment behavior exhibited by the United States in its relationship to the world 
environment during a particular historical period and guided by underlying role conceptions.  
                                                
1 Role theory is also useful in the analysis of foreign policy from a strategic perspective and a 
decision-making perspective. Role theory models these perspectives with the mechanisms of 
role-making in the case of strategy and role contestation in the case of decision-making. See 
Walker (2013) and Cantir and Kaarbo (2012). 
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 According to structure-oriented role theory, the selection of national role conceptions 
(NRCs) is a response to role demands located in the domestic and international environments of 
the United States, which may change over time and lead to the evolution of an existing role or 
transition to another role.2 Role stasis (no change) or the evolutionary enactment of the same role 
conception would indicate relative stability (continuity) in U.S. relations with others in the 
international system, while role transition (change) from one role conception to another would 
indicate relative instability and can mark as well the process that indicates the ending of one 
period and the beginning of another period in the history of U.S. foreign policy (Walker, Malici 
and Schafer 2011; Walker 2013; Kowert and Walker 2014; Schafer, Beieler and Walker 2014).  
 Previous studies of foreign policy change have conceptualized the patterns of continuity 
and change in different ways, depending on the theory employed in the analysis. Examples 
include power transition theory (Organski 1958; Dicicco and Levy 2003), power cycle theory 
(Doran 1971, 1991), and hegemonic stability theory (Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 1981; Modelski 
1987; Milner 1998). All of these theories emphasize the importance of a state’s power position in 
the international system and thereby represent insights from the realist tradition in international 
relations theory.3 The analysis of continuity and change in U.S. foreign policy, especially in the 
context of the “unipolar moment” for the United States following the end of the cold war, has 
focused on the change in the power position of the United States in the international system as 
                                                
2 Agent-centered role theory would emphasize the strategic and decision-making perspectives 
and corresponding mechanisms to account for continuity and change in foreign policy. Role 
theory is a unified theory of world politics in the sense that it offers analyses of foreign policy 
from all three perspectives identified by Lovell (1970; see also Walker (2013: 175-194). 
 
3 Other theoretical perspectives such as liberalism, constructivism, and economism emphasize 
the importance of institutions, culture, and economics, respectively, as sources of structural 
change in the international system and the foreign policies of agents in the system. See Elman 
and Elman (2003) for a review of liberal and constructivist schools of international relations 
theory. McGowan and Walker (1981), Ashley (1983), and Thompson (1983) review the impact 
of economic forces on foreign policy and world politics. 
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well as the alternative theoretical perspectives offered by liberalism, constructivism, and 
economism (Klingberg 1952, 1983, 1996; Holmes 1985; Pfaff 2010; Sylvan and Majeski 2009; 
Lake 1999, 2009; Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Thies 2012).  
 Previous studies of U.S. power transition by Klingberg (1952, 1983, 1996), Holmes 
(1985), Doran (1971, 1991) and Thies (2012) all identify different periods in American 
diplomatic history and corresponding eras in U.S. foreign policy characterized by different roles 
for the United States in world politics. Thies (2012) argues that the transitions in a state’s power 
position are accompanied by changes in status within the international system, which empower a 
state such as the United States either to “take” or “make” different master roles in the system at 
large plus select auxiliary U.S. roles in local or regional subsystems of the global system, e.g., in 
19th century North America and Latin America or in 20th century Asia, Europe, and the Middle 
East.  
 On the one hand, role-taking involves the relatively passive process of taking cues from 
other states or responding to the constraints of power and interests as role demands in locating 
the U.S. role. On the other hand, role-making identifies the more active process of creating a new 
role or insisting on an old role for the United States over the opposition of other states in the 
system. The success of the latter form of role location depends in the long run on the power 
position of the state, which limits its capacity to enact a role and still survive or retain its status 
as a member of the system (Thies 2012; Walker 2013).  
 For example, history is filled with leaders who have aspired to more grand roles for their 
states as local, regional, or global imperial hegemons. Short-run imperial successes were often 
followed by the collapse of empires—e.g., the rise and fall of the ancient Median, Achaemenid, 
Mauryan, and Roman Empires, inter alia, and the historical trajectories of various European 
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empires in modern times ranging from the British and French colonial empires to the Nazi and 
Soviet empires in the 20th century, and finally the American empire over the past two centuries 
(Spruyt 2005; Johnson 2000, 2004, 2006; Nexon and Wright 2007). There are also numerous 
instances of imperial success, as a city-state or nation-state has expanded beyond its initial 
territorial or national boundaries to annex and assimilate adjacent territories or peoples—e.g., the 
expansion of different European entities between the 16th and 19th centuries, the expansion of the 
United States in the Western Hemisphere in the 19th century (Doran 1971; Spruyt 1994; Bailey 
1958), and the Han Empire dating all the way back to the 2nd century BCE. 
 We focus in this paper on the U.S. case, considering the alternating periods of expansion 
and consolidation in U.S. diplomatic history, as well as the general secular trend of improvement 
in the U.S. power position since an American declaration of independence and subsequent 
revolutionary war in 1776 separated the thirteen former British colonies from the British Empire 
to form the United States of America. This war was followed almost immediately by U.S. 
territorial acquisitions from the Spanish and French empires in North America. Much of the 19th 
century was taken up with the U.S. expansion and consolidation of its boundaries extending to 
the Pacific Ocean. This expansion took the form of a series of wars and treaties with Native 
American tribes and negotiated settlements plus limited wars with various European powers and 
their successors in North America, including Britain, Spain, France, Canada, and Mexico (Bailey 
1958; Holmes 1985; Thies 2012). 
 The dawn of the 20th century saw the United States continue to expand its influence and 
control over territories into Latin America and the Far East, sometimes annexing territories and 
at other times establishing U.S. protectorates or spheres of influence over nominally sovereign 
states. This process began with the expansion of U.S. naval power and economic investments in 
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the Pacific and the acquisition of Hawaii and Western Samoa. It continued with expansion into 
the Caribbean and military interventions in Cuba and various Central American states, such as 
Nicaragua and Colombia. In some cases the results even included the acquisition of territories, 
e.g., Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and the Panama Canal Zone (Bailey 
1958; Thies 2012).  
 American diplomatic history in the 20th century can be read as the continuation of 
alternating periods of U.S. expansion and consolidation accompanied by the ongoing rise of the 
United States from a local to a regional to a global power (Ambrose 1983; Thies 2012; Klingberg 
1952; Holmes 1985). Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt renounced the further 
expansion of U.S. territory and promulgated the principle of national self-determination and the 
dissolution of European empires at the peace conferences ending World War I and World War II. 
However, the treaties ending these two world wars also established a network of international 
economic and diplomatic organizations and institutions that would eventually place the United 
States at the apex of the international hierarchy in the global international system by the end of 
the 20th century (Ninkovich 1990, 1994; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Lake 2009; Johnson 2000, 
2004, 2006).  
 What accounts for this historical dynamic of alternating periods of extroversion and 
introversion and fluctuations within each period of U.S. diplomatic history? Is it governed solely 
by the logic of power politics? Do states expand into empires simply because they can? If so, 
what governs whether they can or cannot expand? Why, to take one example, did the U.S. wait 
so long in the twentieth century to assume the mantle of global leadership? Are there important 
differences in the forms of expansion governed by the selection of different roles by the United 
States? If so, what influences the initial processes of role-taking and role-making that lead to the 
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selection of a role and the subsequent processes of role evolution and role transition? Are there 
points in these processes that represent “step-level” changes, in which the U.S. role not only 
evolves but transitions from one role to another? What governs this process of role transition? 
These are the empirical questions that preoccupy us in the remainder of this paper. 
 
Method 
 
 In order to represent the processes of role location in the history of U.S. foreign policy 
and test empirically our models of this process, we employ the typology of strategic role 
orientations developed by Hermann (1987a). The Expansionist role orientation divides the world 
in binary fashion (us vs. them) and seeks gain for ego—in territory, resources, etc.—at the 
expense of alter. The Active Independent orientation seeks participation in the international 
community without dependence on other states. The Influential orientation seeks to shape events 
in the international arena and to have an impact on the foreign policies of other states. The 
Mediator-integrator orientation pursues a "go-between" role and seeks to resolve differences 
among states. The Opportunist orientation pursues advantage when the international 
environment appears to permit it (reacting more than leading). And finally the Developmental 
orientation focuses on long-term improvements in a state's position relative to other states with 
the eventual goal of increased influence (Hermann 1987c: 268-277; cf. Hermann 1987a, 1987b). 
 To calculate scores for each of these six national role conceptions, we take the following 
approach following Hermann (1987a). We perform a Leadership Train Analysis (LTA) of State 
of the Union speeches delivered by every US president, coding them using the online Profiler 
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Plus software package.4 Herman's scheme codes the speeches for six LTA variables: nationalism 
(in-group bias), belief in ability to control events (internal locus of control), need for power, need 
for affiliation, conceptual complexity, and distrust of others (see Hermann 1987a).5 We coded 
only the portion of State of the Union messages dealing with foreign relations for these six 
variables, using Hermann's (1987a) criteria to produce scores for each of the six national role 
conception variables.6 These six role conception scores were calculated for each Congress and 
president using the second and fourth speeches delivered in a typical four-year presidential term.7 
Each of the six scores was re-normed across the dataset as a Z-score to facilitate comparisons. 
                                                
4 The Profiler Plus software package is available from Social Science Automation 
(profilerplus.org). The online coding scheme for LTA variables is an updated version of the LTA 
coding scheme developed by Hermann (2003). The values it produces may not correspond 
exactly to the values produced by the stand alone software package used by Hermann. The text 
of each President's State of the Union messages is available from the American Presidency 
Project website maintained by the University of California Santa Barbara 
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu). Between 1801 (Thomas Jefferson) and 1912 (William 
Howard Taft), State of the Union messages were delivered in written form rather than orally. 
Woodrow Wilson re-established the pattern of oral messages in his 1913 address that has held, 
with some exceptions, ever since. When, on some occasions, presidents delivered both an oral 
and a written version, we have used the former. 
 
5 For Hermann's coding scheme, see Hermann (1987a: 126-127). To calculate NRCs, Hermann 
multiplies each specified LTA score by -1 or -2 if it is inversely related to the NRC, and by 1 or 
2 if it is positively related (LTA scores indicated by an asterisk in Hermann 1987a are those 
multiplied by -2 or +2). 
 
6 Most State of the Union messages include sections focusing specifically on foreign relations, 
and these were the basis of our coding. We also include discussions of relations with Native 
Americans (who, for much of the early history of the republic were represented as an "external" 
threat), of the slave trade, and of economic relations with other countries. We do not include 
discussions of slavery as an internal political issue within the U.S., or of Native Americans once 
they cease to be a frontier issue. We include some discussions of Army or Navy activities, but 
we generally exclude discussions of appropriations and internal organization within the Army or 
Navy unless these paragraphs also specifically discuss other countries. 
 
7 In several instances—1916 (Wilson), 1971 (Nixon), and 1973 (Nixon)—the second or fourth 
speeches contained little or no foreign relations content. In these cases, we coded the preceding 
year's speech (which was also delivered during the same administration and Congress). 
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 These role conceptions may be treated as discrete variables, but they may also be used to 
define a scale ranging from relatively passive and deferential to relatively active and aggressive 
dispositions to exercise power and influence in world politics. The resulting six-position scale 
ranges from -3 (most passive) to +3 (most active) as follows: −3 (Developmental), −2 
(Opportunist), −1 (Mediator-Integrator), +1 (Influential), +2 (Active-Independent), +3 
(Expansionist). We might expect to find that positive (+) role conceptions (Influential, Active-
Independent, and Expansionist) characterize the strategic role orientations of U.S. presidents 
during periods of extroversion and that negative (−) role conceptions (Mediator-Integrator, 
Opportunist, Development) characterize the strategic role orientations of U.S. presidents during 
periods of introversion. To facilitate the exploration of such hypotheses, this national role 
conception (NRC) scale is designed without a midpoint of 0 for subcomponent values (in other 
words, values on the composite NRC scale are defined by multiplying each of the six LTA role 
conception scores by either a positive or negative number and then summing the results). 
 The NRC scale yields a general measure of the extent to which national role conceptions 
are externally-oriented and assertive. Two forms of this scale are useful for our purposes. First, 
because an NRC score is calculated for each Congress, the basic NRC scale (NRC-2) represents 
a biennial measure of the U.S. national role conception, as enunciated by the president. Because 
these representations fluctuate somewhat from year to year depending on current events, we also 
calculate an 8-year moving average of the NRC scores (NRC-8) that smoothed out transitions in 
role conceptions and that may provide a more general measure of prevailing role conceptions.8 
                                                
8 NRC-8 is an average of a given year's NRC score and the three preceding NRC scores included 
in the data (each of which represents a two-year period). Because of omitted data (presidents 
who did not deliver a State of the Union message), NRC-8 occasionally (but infrequently) 
represents an average over a period longer than eight years. 
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We investigate determinants of national role conceptions at three levels. First, at the level of the 
international system, we want to account for the selection of these role conceptions by reference 
to the role demands on U.S. presidents, such as those identified in different historical periods by 
Klingberg (1952) and Holmes (1985). These structural constraints include different external 
Realpolitik conditions identified by Doran (1991) and Trubowitz (2011), which are associated 
with periods of expansion (extroversion) and consolidation (introversion) in the U.S. rise in 
status in the international system.  
 As a baseline measure of these demands, we use the Composite Index of National 
Capabilities (CINC) available within the National Material Capabilities database, version 3.02 
(Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987). CINC measures a state's capabilities as a share 
of the international system (cf. Doran 1991), based on six indicators: total population, urban 
population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military 
expenditure. The National Material Capabilities data for the U.S. begins in 1815; cases before 
this year are thus omitted from our dataset.  
 To test the analyses by Klingberg (1952) and Holmes (1985), which identify alternating 
periods of introversion and extroversion in U.S. foreign policy, we also code Klingberg's periods 
as a dummy variable. Klingberg's extroversion refers to “positive pressure” exerted by the 
United States in world affairs in the form of uses of force, territorial annexations, strong 
diplomatic statements, and economic sanctions, which is an expression of “a nation’s willingness 
to bring its influence to bear upon other nations” (Klingberg 1952: 240). Introversion 
characterizes a state that is “unwilling to exert much positive pressure upon other nations” (ibid). 
In this conceptualization extroversion and introversion are alternating moods or dispositions to 
act, which are manifested by the presence or absence of extroverted behavior. Finally, we code 
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Thies's (2012) master role periods as a simple step function ranging from novice (coded "1") to 
unipolar hegemon (coded "6"). 
 Role demands may also include the domestic constraints of a divided versus a united 
government (Holmes 1985; Trubowitz 2011). These variables are measured at the national level 
of analysis by determining whether or not the president’s political party controls each house of 
the U.S. Congress.9 We also calculate a derived variable that measures whether the president 
controls neither, one, or both houses of Congress. Finally, we determine whether each house is 
controlled by a party of the left or the right in each Congress. 
 At the individual level of analysis, the motivational orientation of the United States to 
exercise power is measured by the motivational imagery in the rhetoric of U.S. presidents 
(Winter 1973; cf. Holmes 1985; Hermann 1987a, 1987b). Inspired by the research of David 
Winter (1973) and applications by Holmes and Elder (1985), we anticipate that a president's 
motivational imagery reflects the effects of the interaction between that leader’s personality and 
the role demands in his domestic and international political environments. Winter calculates 
motive imagery by coding a president's inaugural address for language indicative of one of three 
motive images:  need for Power (nPow), need for Achievement (nAch), and need for Affiliation 
(nAff). We use Winter's coding, including updates reported in Post (2003: 160) and Winter 
(2011: 1068). Presidents who did not deliver a State of the Union message (e.g., vice presidents 
who took office after the death of a president) are omitted from the dataset.  
 Collectively, these variables constitute a cross-level, socio-cognitive model of the 
historical dynamics associated with the role-taking mechanisms that we hypothesize influences 
the selection of role conceptions by U.S. presidents. If our model is valid, then logically 
                                                
9 For a record of party division and control in the Senate, see:  
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm. In the House, 
see: http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions. 
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expressions of role conceptions in U.S. foreign policy are likely to exhibit continuity so long as 
the underlying conditions shaping role demands are stable. If the role demands change so that 
they are no longer congruent with U.S. role conceptions, they should influence the evolution of 
U.S. role orientations within introversion or extroversion periods and also the transition in U.S. 
roles across periods.  
 Therefore, we shall assess whether or not the strategic role orientations demonstrate face 
and content validity regarding their levels of extroversion under different role demands. If role 
orientations are congruent (match up) with role demands, then we can infer a significant 
symbiotic relationship between the Psychopolitik of the U.S. president’s role conceptions and 
role demands in the domestic Innenpolitik and international Realpolitik models. Our general 
analysis of historical dynamics consists of these models operating and interacting at three levels 
of analysis. The dependent variable in each of the models is the balance of extroversion and 
introversion role orientations exhibited in the public statements of U.S. presidents over time, as 
measured by an NRC scale. The modeling effort is to compare and contrast the profiles of these 
role orientations across presidential terms and historical eras characterized by differences in role 
demands.  
 
Data Analysis and Discussion 
 
 In the Psychopolitik model we hypothesize that a leader’s nAch, nPow and nAff scores 
are positively related to the leader’s NRC scale scores. Individual deficits in any of these three 
categories of motivation might be compensated for by a more aggressive national role 
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conception. Different motive profiles may be related to the adoption of specific national role 
conceptions as well.  
 The Innenpolitik model suggests competing hypotheses about the relationship between 
the domestic role demands of divided versus united government on NRC scale scores. When one 
party controls both the White House and the Congress, the NRC might be higher because the 
president can mobilize the support necessary to sustain a more expansive vision of national 
purpose. Or, conversely, a lack of support in Congress might encourage presidents to articulate a 
more assertive national role conception in order to generate congressional support (Lowi 1985; 
Gaubatz 1999).  
 Finally, the Realpolitik model anticipates a positive relationship between the U.S. share 
of national capabilities in the international system and a higher NRC scale score (more expansive 
national role conceptions). Beginning with the Realpolitik model, we test these three models 
individually in the following three sections. Then we perform a regression analysis on a full 
model of NRC scale scores, in which the hypotheses associated with each level are tested 
simultaneously to determine whether the mechanisms in the hypotheses survive a multivariate 
analysis test and to explore interaction effects.  
 
Secular Trends and Realpolitik 
 The first step in our analysis is to examine the secular trends in two of our variables that 
chart the rise of the United States in world politics. One is the rise in American power while the 
other is the rise in more extroverted or assertive U.S. national role orientations. These two trends 
are presented in Figure 1 against the backdrop of step-function changes in the U. S. master role 
status over the same time period. For the purpose of this analysis, to smooth out trends in these 
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role conceptions, we employ the 8-year moving average of the NRC scores (NRC-8) for this step, 
re-normed as a T-score (µ = 50, 1 standard deviation = 10). 
 There is a general upward trend in all three variables. As the share of U.S. national 
capabilities in the international system grows, there is also a tendency toward more assertive U.S. 
national role conceptions. These two trends are consistent, moreover, with the step-level changes 
in the U.S. master role status from novice sovereign state to small power, major power, and great 
power (Thies 2012).10 The correlation between NRC-8 and CINC is 0.59 (p<.0005, 2-tailed test); 
the correlation between NRC-8 and Thies master role status is an even higher 0.81 (p<.0005, 2-
tailed test). 
 
Figure 1:  Secular Trends in US Power and National Role Conceptions 
 
 Generally speaking, therefore, U.S. presidents enunciate a more assertive national role 
conception (i.e., characterized by expansionism or active independence) as the US share of 
power in the international system grows. Figure 1 also shows several periods when this 
                                                
10 To the four master role status categories identified by Thies (2012), we have added two more:  
superpower status (beginning in 1945), and unipolar hegemon status (beginning in 1989). This 
creates a total of six master role status categories, as shown in the step function on Figure 1. 
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relationship does not obtain. Unsurprisingly, in the run up to the civil war U.S. attention turned 
inward even as U.S. power continued to grow (until the war actually broke out, after which 
CINC fell). Similarly, in the years before World War I the NRC-8 fell even as CINC grew. 
Finally, and most intriguingly, US power and the NRC scale score both fell gradually after 
World War II, but only up to the 1970s. Since then, the NRC-8 scale score has rebounded in a 
more assertive direction even though US power as a share of the international system (CINC) has 
not markedly increased. 
 
Figure 2:  Secular Trends in Introverted and Extroverted Role Conceptions 
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 To visualize phases in these general trends more clearly, Figure 2 divides the NRC scale 
score into separate scale scores for extroverted role conceptions (Expansionist, Active 
Independent, and Influential) and introverted role conceptions (Mediator, Opportunist, and 
Developmental). These scores are presented as T scores, along with a step function showing 
Klingberg's extroverted and introverted periods (the line is high for extroverted periods). A 6th 
order polynomial regression trendline is also superimposed over the lines reporting the 
introverted role and extroverted role T scores (a solid line for extroversion and a dashed line for 
introversion). The most apparent trend is perhaps the gradual increase in the extroversion scale T 
scores (solid line) and decrease in the introversion scale T scores (dashed line). With polynomial 
smoothing, the introversion scale T scores in particular approximate a sine wave, though one 
with a longer period than Klingberg's cycles. The two waves cross in approximately 1910. There 
is no obvious correspondence between the introversion and extroversion scale T scores and 
Klingberg's cycles. We anticipated that time periods shortly before or after the Klingberg 
transitions might also reveal a convergence of the introversion and extroversion NRC scale 
scores, but Figure 2 reveals no obvious support for this hypothesis. 
 As one further test for cyclical patterns such as those described by Klingberg (1952, 
1983), however, we might hypothesize that the overall NRC scale score (shown in Figure 1) is 
likely to be higher in periods when US power is increasing, and lower in periods when it is 
decreasing. In fact, the reverse is true:  periods of falling power in Figure 1 are associated with 
more assertive NRC-8 scores, lending some credence to the notion that international role 
demands create political "deficits," for which presidents must compensate, rather than 
opportunities to be exploited. A more aggressive national role conception may be a tool in the 
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president's arsenal. Figure 3 reports the results of an ANOVA confirming that periods of falling 
power are significantly associated (p≤0.01) with more aggressive NRC scores.  
  
Figure 3:  A Comparison of NRC-8 Scores in Periods of National Decline and Rise 
(n=85; significant at p≤0.01 level, one-way ANOVA) 
 In general, the corresponding secular trends in national role conceptions (toward more 
assertive roles), in an increasing U.S. share of power within the international system, and in the 
gradual step function escalation of master roles identified by Thies serves as a further proof-of-
concept for Herman's scheme to map national role conceptions using LTA analysis. Both the 
correspondence to long-term trends evident in Figures 1 and 2, and the deviations from these 
trends prior to the civil war and World War I are readily intelligible. It would have cast doubt on 
the approach if the NRC scales had failed to track U.S. power in this fashion. 
 
Innenpolitik 
  Figure 3 points toward a tentative answer to the question of whether congressional 
politics operate as an enabling or constraining condition on the emergence of more assertive 
national role conceptions. If the former, then presidential control of one or both houses of 
1.116	  
-­‐2.023	  -­‐2.5	  -­‐2	  
-­‐1.5	  -­‐1	  
-­‐0.5	  0	  
0.5	  1	  
1.5	  
Power	  Falling	   Power	  Rising	  
Ro
le
	  C
on
ce
pt
io
n	  
Sc
al
e,
	  8
-­‐y
ea
r	  
µ	  
(N
RC
-­‐8
)	  
  
 
18 
Congress should be associated with higher NRC scores. If the latter, then a Congress controlled 
by the president's opposition will be more likely to produce higher NRC scores (as part of a 
presidential effort to rally congressional support for administration policies). 
 In the Innenpolitik models, separate one-way ANOVA models of NRC scores show 
different patterns for the biennial role scores (NRC-2) and for the eight-year moving average 
NRC score (NRC-8). The ANOVA model for the biennial role scores shows no significant 
difference based on whether or not the President's party controls the Senate, but differences in 
the NRC-8 scores are approaching significance (p≤0.07, n=85); the mean NRC-8 score is -1.16 
when the President's party controls the Senate, and 1.50 when the President's party does not. On 
the other hand, in the House, NRC-2 and NRC-8 scores both differ in marginally significant 
ways depending on whether the president's party is in control.  
In the House, the mean NRC-2 score is -1.39 when the President's party controls the 
House, and 1.97 when it does not (p≤0.06, n=85); the mean NRC-8 score is -1.32 when the 
President's party controls the House, and 1.09 when it does not (p≤0.07, n=85). One might 
expect that cumulative control would produce an even more prominent effect. If control of each 
house were separately associated with less aggressive NRCs, then control of both houses would 
presumably maximize this effect. Yet this is not the case. An ANOVA testing differences in the 
mean NRC-2 scores for presidential control of neither, one, or both houses failed to show a 
significant relationship.  
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Figure 4:  National Role Conception 8-Year Rolling Average and Control of Congress 
(n=85; p≤0.01, adjusted R2 = 0.10 for two-way model) 
For the mean NRC-8 scores, on the other hand, there is a significant difference in mean scores, 
but not in the expected fashion. The mean NRC-8 score when the president controls neither 
house is 3.09, -2.85 when he controls one house, and -0.98 when he controls both (p≤0.007, 
n=85). It would appear that something more complex is going on. To explore this relationship, 
we performed a two-way univariate ANOVA of NRC-8 scores. The two-way ANOVA model 
shown in Figure 4 suggests that when the President does not control the Senate, controlling the 
House makes a big difference. Put another way, when the President does control the Senate, it 
does not matter as much whether he controls the House. When the President controls the House 
but not the Senate, his stated NRC is much less aggressive.11  When he controls neither house, 
his stated role conception is at its most aggressive.  
                                                
11 There are only four cases in which the president controlled the House but not the Senate in our 
data:  the 19th Congress under John Quincy Adams, the 23rd Congress under Andrew Jackson, 
and the 49th and 50th Congresses under Grover Cleveland. So although the model is significant, 
given the size of the effect, a word of caution is in order about generalizing only from these cases. 
In contrast, there were 18 Congresses in our data in which the president's party controlled neither 
house, 12 in which his party controlled the Senate but not the House, and 51 cases in which the 
president's party controlled both houses. 
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Figure 5:  National Role Conception 8-Year Rolling Average and Control of Congress 
(n=85) 
Generally speaking, then, it is a lack of presidential support in Congress, and particularly in the 
House, that is associated with more assertive national role conceptions.  
 We can further explore the effect by performing an ANOVA of the mean scores for each 
NRC separately when the president's party controls the House and when it does not. The mean 
scores for the Expansionist role conception are significantly higher (p≤0.05) when the President's 
party does not control the House than when it does (see the first column, Figure 5). The mean 
scores for the Active Independent role conception are also higher (at a marginal significance 
level p≤0.10) and the Opportunist scores are lower (at a marginal significance level, p≤0.08). 
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Psychopolitik 
 We turn next to the interaction between role demands generated at the level of the 
individual and the president's public statements about national role conceptions. It should not be 
surprising to find some relationship between a president's personality characteristics and the 
national role demands he embraces. We will examine the general interaction between this 
Psychopolitik and NRCs in the next section, where we will present a general model that controls 
for the influences of the domestic and international levels. Before turning to this model, however, 
it may be fruitful to explore whether specific motives at the individual level are associated with 
any particular national role conceptions. 
 To assess any such relationships, we present three ANOVA models of the six NRC role 
scores (Expansionist, Active Independent, Influential, Mediator, Opportunist, and 
Developmental). Figure 6 presents the ANOVA model for three independent variable factors:  a 
need for Achievement (nAch) score 1 standard deviation below the mean, a nAch score within 1 
standard deviation of the mean, and a nAch score 1 standard deviation above the mean. Scores 
for the Active Independent and Influential NRCs differ significantly, depending on nAch, at the 
p≤0.01 level. Scores for the Opportunist NRC differ at the p≤0.02 level. And differences in 
scores for the Expansionist and Developmental NRCs are approaching significance (p≤0.08 and 
p≤0.10, respectively). Differences in presidential need for achievement, in other words, are 
associated with the likelihood of embracing several of the national role conceptions. 
  
 
22 
 
Figure 6:  National Role Conception 8-Year Rolling Average and need for Achievement 
(n=85) 
 A similar pattern holds true for differences in presidential need for affiliation (nAff), as 
shown in Figure 7. Scores for the Influential and Developmental NRCs differ significantly, 
depending on whether presidents are high, moderate, or low on need for affiliation, at the p≤0.01 
level. Scores for the Opportunist NRC differ at the p≤0.02 level. And differences in scores for 
the other NRCs are not significant.  
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Figure 7:  National Role Conception 8-Year Rolling Average and need for Affiliation 
(n=85) 
 Finally, differences in presidential need for power (nPow) are associated with significant 
differences in the likelihood of enunciating an Expansionist, Active Independent, or Opportunist 
NRC (all at the p≤0.01 level), as indicated in Figure 8. Generally speaking, presidential motive 
profiles are associated with an increased or decreased likelihood of embracing certain national 
role conceptions. In the case of all significant relationships, a motive profile indicating greater 
presidential needs (for achievement, affiliation, or power) was associated with an increased 
likelihood of more assertive NRCs and a decreased likelihood of more inward-looking or passive 
NRCs. 
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Figure 8:  National Role Conception 8-Year Rolling Average and need for Power 
(n=85) 
 
General Model 
 Finally, we report the results of a “cross-level” regression analysis of role-taking effects 
by independent variables at the individual, domestic, and international levels of analysis in the 
Psychopolitik, Innenpolitik, and Realpolitik models. Table 1 shows two versions of this 
analysis—one for the biennial role conceptions (NRC-2), and one for the 8-year moving NRC 
averages (NRC-8)—and two models for each version. The first model for each version reports 
the multivariate effects of the variables at each level discussed in the previous sections. The 
second model adds motive profile interaction terms. 
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Table 1:  National Role Conception Scores  
as a Function of Psychopolitik, Innenpolitik, and Realpolitik 
  
Model 
Dependent Variable: 
NRC-2 Scores 
Dependent Variable: 
NRC-8 Scores 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
(Beta) t Sig. 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
(Beta) t Sig. 
1 (Constant)  -2.758 .007  -4.359 .000 
Z nAch .293 2.982 .004 .198 2.409 .018 
Z nAff .072 .637 .526 .220 2.316 .023 
Z nPow .164 1.514 .134 .174 1.927 .058 
Control House -.219 -1.977 .052 -.078 -.848 .399 
Control Senate .174 1.467 .146 -.010 -.102 .919 
CINC µ .301 3.070 .003 .464 5.661 .000 
2 (Constant)  -3.163 .002  -4.836 .000 
Z nAch .217 2.223 .029 .116 1.477 .144 
Z nAff .143 .910 .366 .340 2.686 .009 
Z nPow -.017 -.137 .891 -.004 -.042 .966 
ZnAch * ZnAff -.220 -1.614 .111 -.278 -2.552 .013 
ZnAch * ZnPow .395 3.012 .004 .416 3.960 .000 
ZnAff * ZnPow .010 .087 .931 -.019 -.198 .843 
Control House -.223 -2.076 .041 -.085 -.986 .328 
Control Senate .199 1.697 .094 .021 .228 .821 
CINC µ .357 3.532 .001 .513 6.329 .000 
        
 
Model 1 adj. R2=0.318;  
Model 2 adj. R2=0.368; 
n=85, significant relationships 
in bold 
Model 1 adj. R2=0.524;  
Model 2 adj. R2=0.594; 
n=85, significant relationships 
in bold 
  
 Presidential need for achievement (nAch), control of the House by the opposition party, 
and national capabilities (CINC) are all associated with more assertive biennial NRCs (NRC-2). 
When the NRC data are smoothed out over 8 years (NRC-8), all three motive profile 
(Psychopolitik) variables have significant effects, as does CINC, while control of the House is no 
longer significant (perhaps because the longer time span washes out its effects). 
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 When interaction terms among the Psychopolitik variables of nAch, nPow, and nAff are 
introduced in the lower half of Table 1, a significant (p≤0.004) interaction between nAch and 
nPow increases the likelihood of assertive biennial NRCs. Presidents who are high in their need 
for both power and achievement are especially likely to articulate assertive NRCs, above and 
beyond the significant effect of nAch by itself (which also raises NRC-2 values). In this model, 
control of the House by the president's party again has the effect of reducing NRC-2 values. 
Finally, in the second, longer-term (NRC-8) version of the interaction-term model, both the 
nAch-nAff and nAch-nPow interactions have significant effects in opposite directions, while 
nAff by itself continues to have a significant positive effect. In both models and both versions, 
growing U.S. power (CINC) has a significant effect, increasing the likelihood of more assertive 
NRCs. The adjusted R2 values for the version 1 (NRC-2) models are 0.318 without the 
interaction terms and 0.368 with the interaction terms; for version 2 (NRC-8), the adjusted R2 
values are 0.524 without the interaction terms and 0.594 with the interaction terms. 
 We tested several other specifications of the general model in addition to those presented 
here. It is worth noting that dummy variables indicating whether national capabilities were 
increasing or decreasing and whether the country was in one of Klingberg's periods of 
extroversion or introversion did not make significant contributions to the models. Nor did the 
cumulative domestic control variable (measuring whether the president's party controlled two, 
one, or neither house of Congress). The Thies master role variable (a step function increasing 
from 1 to 6) was strongly associated with NRC-2 and NRC-8, even more so than CINC although 
the two were strongly correlated (Pearson's R=0.605, p≤.0005, two-tailed test). This would be 
true of any steadily increasing variable given the general growth in US power. To avoid 
problems of multicollinearity, the Thies master role variable was thus omitted from the analysis. 
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Conclusion 
 
  Tests at each level of analysis offer strong and consistent support for the argument that 
variables at multiple levels shape national role demands in foreign policy. The most apparent 
secular trend in U.S. foreign policy is the shift toward more assertive role conceptions, such as 
Expansionist or Active Independent, as American power has grown. There is also more limited 
support for descriptive cyclical arguments. Periods of relative downturn in national capabilities 
are modestly and somewhat surprisingly associated with the articulation of more assertive 
national roles. Decline from a relatively high power position would seem to be particularly 
associated with more assertive roles, a finding that echoes the claims of power transition theory 
(Dicicco and Levy 2003). At the domestic level of analysis, the control of Congress (particularly 
the House) by the president's party is associated with less rather than more assertive national role 
statements. At the individual level of analysis, presidential needs for achievement, affiliation, or 
power are all associated, under certain circumstances, with assertive NRCs.  
A cross-level, general regression analysis suggests that role-taking mechanisms continue 
to operate at all three levels of analysis when variables at each level are simultaneously taken 
into account in the short-run NRC-2 model. Over the longer time period encompassed by the 
NR-8 model, the effects of Innenpolitik mechanisms appear insignificant. But we found strong 
support, in a series of ANOVAs, for relationships between specific patterns of House or Senate 
control and particular national role conceptions. Taken together, these findings suggest a 
"deficit" model in which more externally oriented, more assertive national role conceptions 
appear to compensate for presidential needs (either personal or political) in other areas of 
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political life. These results represent an initial attempt to model the long-run dynamics of the U.S. 
rise in world politics over the past two hundred years.  
Future research is needed to explore further the effects of cross-level interactions and, 
particularly, of Innenpolitik on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Historical deviations from the 
general secular trend toward greater U.S. involvement in the international system should also be 
subject to closer examination. This study has considered only a very limited set of domestic and 
international variables. These investigations may also be enriched by adopting the strategic and 
decision-making perspectives identified by Lovell (1970) to analyze short-run episodes in U.S. 
diplomatic history. All three perspectives can be employed to link U.S. national role conceptions 
to U.S. foreign policy behavior reported in event data sets for the contemporary period of U.S. 
diplomatic history (Schafer, Beieler, and Walker 2014).  
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